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Comment
AN EXAMINATION OF THE NAMING REQUIREMENT OF
TITLE III IN LIGHT OF
UNITED STATES V. DONOVAN-A CASE FOR SUPPRESSION.
"We act differently if we believe we are being observed. If we can
never be sure whether or not we are being watched and listened
to, all our actions will be altered and our very character will
change."
Hubert H. Humphrey*
I. INTRODUCTION

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(Title III)1 prohibits the interception of wire or oral communications unless
implemented under court order. 2 Drafted in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Berger v. New York 3 and Katz v. United States, 4 which
established the prerequisites for a constitutional electronic surveillance statute, 5 the purposes of Title III are to protect "the privacy of wire and oral
communications" and to delineate "on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications
6
may be authorized."
Despite this enunciated congressional purpose, it appears that recent
Supreme Court decisions are slowly eroding the procedural safeguards of
* Humphrey, Foreword to E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS at viii (1967).
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). For an excellent, in depth examination of Title III, see
J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1977). For a discussion of the authorization
process under Title III,
see, e.g., Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applications under Title III:
Another Dissent to Giordano and Chavez, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 750 (1975); Note, 24 DE PAUL
L. REV. 227 (1974).
2. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2113.

3. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, the Supreme Court struck down a New York electronic
surveillance statute as overbroad and thus violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 44. For a discussion of Berger, see notes 15-21 and accompanying text infra.
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Supreme Court in Katz discussed the "trespass" doctrine of
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and held that the fourth amendment protects
oral statements from unreasonable seizure although there has been no physical instrusion into a
speaker's constitutionally protected area. 389 U.S. at 350-53.
5. See notes 15-21 and accompanying text infra.
6. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2153. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 426, 428 (1977). Congress,
when drafting Title III, had long been aware of the potential abuses of electronic surveillance.
See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 162, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2224; S. REP. No. 1304, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 383 (1940). See generally Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-53 (1967); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963): Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463-85 (1928)
(dissenting opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, J. J.). It is interesting to note that eavesdropping,
the predecessor of modern electronic surveillance, was condemned at common law as a nuisance. 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 169.
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Title 111. 7 In United States v. Donovan," the Supreme Court held that a
violation of the naming requirement of Title III 9 does not require suppression of the evidence gathered through the use of electronic surveillance. 10
The Court implied, however, that such evidence may be suppressed if the
defendant could prove that he* was prejudiced by the failure to name him in
the interception application or to send him inventory notice, or that the
government intentionally violated Title IlI.11
This comment will examine the effect of the Supreme Court's decision
in Donovan on the Title III requirements relating to the identification of the
2
It
person whose communications are to be, or have been, intercepted.'
will then propose two alternatives to Donovan: first, that a violation of the
naming requirement should mandate suppression;13 and second, accepting
the Court's holding in Donovan, that if a violation occurs, the burden of
proof should shift to the government to prove a lack of prejudice to the
1 4
defendant or that the violation was in fact unintentional.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Statute
In Berger v. New York, 15 the Supreme Court struck down a New York
electronic surveillance statute 16 as overbroad and thus violative of the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. 17 The statute, while requiring the naming of
the person or persons whose communications were to be intercepted, 18 did

7. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977). United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562
(1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143
(1974). For a discussion of Donovan, see notes 48-64 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Chavez and Giordano, see notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of
Kahn, see notes 33-40 and accompanying text infra.
8. 429 U.S. 413 (1977). For a discussion of Donovan, see notes 48-64 and accompanying
text infra.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv)(1976). The naming of persons comes into play at two points
under Title III. First, the application requesting authorization for electronic surveillance must
specificy "the identity of the the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted," Id. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text infra. Second, the
identification of persons overheard during the intercept plays an integral part in the statutory
requirement of postinterception inventory notice. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976); notes 26-29
and accompanying text infra.
10. 429 U.S. at 432-34.
* The masculine form is used throughout this comment for convenience; the feminine form
would be equally applicable.
11. Id. at 436 n.23, 439 n.26. See text accompanying note 60 infra.
12. See note 9 supra; notes 22-24 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 67-120 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 121-38 and accompanying text infra.
15. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
16. 1942 N.Y. LAws ch. 924, as amended (codified at N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 813-a (1958)
(repealed 1968)).
17. 388 U.S. at 44. For the pertinent text of the fourth amendment, see note 20 infra. The
fourth amendment is applicable to the states by operation of the fourteenth amendment. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
18. 388 U.S. at 59.
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not compel the applicant to specify the nature of the conversations to be
overheard. 19 The Court, relying upon the fourth amendment's requirement
of particularity in describing "the persons or things to be seized," 20 held
that by failing to require a particularized description of the communication
to be intercepted, the statute granted the officer executing the order an
21
overbroad scope of discretion.
Congress, in drafting Title III, endeavored to meet the constitutional
requirement of particularization expressed in Berger.22 For example, section 2518 of Title III requires, inter alia, that each application for the judicial approval of an interception of wire or oral communications identify "the
person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to
be intercepted." 23 The inclusion of this information in the application was
intended to foster judicial review and to prevent the abusive use of electronic surveillance. 24 These policies are further reflected in the fact that the
19. Id. Title III satisfies this requirement through the particularization required by §
2518(I)(b), 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1976), and by requiring minimization of the interception of
communications outside the scope of the authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). See notes
22-26 and accompanying text infra.
20. 388 U.S. at 56, quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides, in
pertinent part, that a warrant must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See J. CARR, supra note I at 33-40.
21. 388 U.S. at 59. The Court compared this lack of particularization to the "truly offensive
character" of general warrants. Id. at 58. General warrants arose during the revolutionary era,
when England's "customs officials were given blanket authority to conduct general searches for
goods imported to the Colonies in violation of the tax laws of the Crown." Id.
The Court noted that general warrants were "a motivating factor behind the Declaration of
Independence." Id. The majority stated that the fourth amendment repudiated general warrants, since it made "general searches .. .impossible and prevent[ed] the seizure of one thing
tinder a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of
the officer executing the warrant." Id., quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196
(1927).
22. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2112, 2189-90.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1976). The application must also include a statement of the
facts and circumstances establishing probable cause to believe that a particular offense has been,
is being, or is about to be committed, id. § 2518(1)(b)(i); a description of the location where the
interception is to be conducted, id.§ 2518(1)(b)(ii); a description of the type of communication
sought to be intercepted, id.§ 2518(1)(b)(iii); a statement of why other investigative procedures
are not feasible or have not been successful, id.§ 2518(1)(c); and the period of time for which
the interception is to be maintained, id. § 2518(1)(d). The application must also disclose all
previous applications for interception authorization made to any judge that involve any person
named in the current application. Id. § 2518(1)(e).
The application may be made to a federal judge by the Attorney General of the United
States, id. § 2526(1), or to a state court judge when the principle prosecuting attorney of the
state or a political subdivision thereof is authorized by state statute to seek wiretap authorization. Id. § 2516(2). Judicial approval of the application is conditioned upon satisfactory compliance with the requirements of § 2518. See id.§§ 2518(1)-(3).
24. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2112, 2185. Under § 2518(3) of Title III, the judge has discretion to determine
whether the authorization should be granted. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976). The requirement
that the application include all information relating to prior electronic surveillance is designed to
aid the judge in the intelligent exercise of this discretion and to protect an individual from
"fishing expeditions" by government agents. See, e.g., United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d
996, 1000-01 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 430 U.S. 902, rev'd, 556 F.2d 244 (4th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Bellosi, 501 F.2d 833, 836-40 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Haina v. State, 30

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 73

judicial authorization of the interception, if granted, must specify the target
2 5
of the interception.
In addition to focusing the interception upon specific individuals and
minimizing the interception of unrelated communications, 26 the naming requirement also "triggers" the mandatory notification procedure of section
2518(8)(d), 27 which provides that inventory notice be sent to those persons
named in the judicial authorization. 28 The section further provides that
notification may be required to identifiable persons who, although not
2 9
named in the judicial authorization, had their conversations intercepted.
This inventory notice requirement was designed to remove the public's fear
of "secret" surveillance, 3o and provides a basis for civil liability for allegedly
31
unlawful interception.
In addition to these civil remedies, Title III provides for suppression of
evidence obtained by electronic surveillance if: "(i) the communication was
unlawfully intercepted; (ii) the order of authorization or approval under
which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or (iii) the interception
32
was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval."
Md. App. 295, 302, 352 A.2d 874, 880 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977). See also
United States v. Doolittle, 518 F.2d 500, 501-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977); notes 21 & 23 supra.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(a) (1976).
26. Title III requires, inter alia, that an interception be conducted "in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this
chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 158-63 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 188 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976). For a discussion of the "triggering" effect of § 2518(8)(d),
see United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 446-49 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part);
note 28 and accompanying text infra.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976). The inventory notice must include the fact that an application was entered, the date of the application, whether authorization was granted or denied,
the period of the interception, and whether any communications were intercepted during the
term of the order. Id. The notice must be served within ninety days, although the judge may
extend this period upon a showing of good cause. Id. The judge also has discretionary authority,
upon motion, to disclose portions of the actual transcript to persons whose conversations have
been intercepted. Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976). The serving of this notice is within the judge's discretion,
the criterion being whether it is in "the interest of justice." Id. If an individual has actual notice
of an interception, this may satisfy the notification requirements of Title III. See United States
v. Alfonso, 552 F.2d 605, 614 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); United States v.
Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
30. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-Standards Relating to
Electronic Surveillance § 5.15 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
31. Id. Title III confers a cause of action on "[a]ny person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation" of its provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
Without notice of an interception, an individual would be unable to invoke this civil remedy for
an unwarranted invasion of privacy. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 449-50 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2194.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976). These statutory grounds for suppression are to be read in
the alternative. 429 U.S. at 433 n.22.
Any "aggrieved person" may move to suppress the contents of an interception. 18 U.S.C. §
251 8 (10)(a) (1976). An "aggrieved person" is one who was a party to an interception or against
whom an interception was directed. Id. § 2510(11).
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B. The Case Law
One of the pivotal questions which arose in the interpretation of Title
III's provisions was the issue of who must be named in the application for
judicial authorization. In United States v. Kahn,33 Mrs. Kahn, the wife of
the individual named in an interception application, 11 was indicted on the
basis of evidence obtained through the telephone wiretap. 3 5 In support of
her motion to suppress the fruits of the wiretap, Mrs. Kahn asserted that she
was a person "known" within the meaning of Title 111,3 0 and that the interception of her communications was therefore unlawful due to the failure to
name her in the application and authorization. 37 The Supreme Court reversed the granting of Mrs. Kahn's motion to suppress,3a and rejected the
argument that the statutory language "if known" includes any person whom
"careful investigation by the government would disclose were probably using
3 9
The Court
[the target] telephones in conversations for illegal activities."
held that a person must be named in the application and authorization only
if the government possesses information that would tend to establish probaperson was committing the offense and was
ble cause to believe that that
40
using the target telephone.
Both prior and subsequent to Kahn, lower court decisions that considered this naming issue had held that if probable cause similar to that found
in Kahn existed, 41 a person must be named in the application and authoriza-

33. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
34. The application and authorization named Mr. Kahn and "others as yet unknown." Id. at
144-45.
35. Id. at 145-46. Both Mr. and Mrs. Kahn were indicted for using means of commerce for
unlawful activity, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). 415 U.S. at 147-48.
36. See 415 U.S. at 149; note 9 supra; text accompanying note 23 supra.
37. 415 U.S. at 148-49. Mrs, Kahn also moved to suppress the intercepted communications
on the ground of "marital privilege." Id. Section 2517(4) of Title IIIstates: "[N]o otherwise
privileged wire or oral communication intercepted .. . shall lose its privileged character." 18

U.S.C. § 2517(4) (1976).
38. 415 U.S. at 151. The district court granted the motion to suppress on both the grounds
of "marital privilege" and the failure to name Mrs. Kahn as a "known" person within the
meaning of § 2518. Id. at 148-49. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but only on the latter ground.
Id. at 149.
39. Id. at 149, quoting United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). The
concluded that if Congress had meant for "discoverCourt, examining the language of Title Ill,
able" persons to be named in the application, it would have explicitly drafted such a requirement into § 2518. 415 U.S. at 151-53. The Court further stated that "[a] requirement that the
Government fully investigate the possibility that any likely user of a telephone is engaging in
criminal activities before applying for an interception order would greatly subvert the effectiveness of the law enforcement mechanism that Congress constructed." Id. at 153.
40. 415 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added). Reasoning by extension, the Court concluded that if
an interception is valid as to a named person, there is no "additional requirement that the
Government investigate all persons who may be using the subject telephone in order to determine their possible complicity." Id. at 153-54 n.12. The Court also determined that evidence
obtained from this interception can be used against such an "unknown" individual. Id. at
155-57. Accord, United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 181, 186-88 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 324-25 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd,
506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975).
41. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
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of evidence
tion, and that a failure to do so may require suppression at trial
42
conversations.
individual's
that
of
interception
an
from
gathered
Shortly after Kahn, however, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Chavez 43 and United States v. Giordano,44 which involved the faulty
identification of the federal officials who authorized the wiretap applications. 45 In both cases, the Court emphasized that Congress intended to
require suppression only where there is a "failure to satisfy any of those
statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative
device." 46 Although there might be a failure to adhere to Title III's provisions, the Court concluded that the suppression of evidence will not be replays a "central" or "substantive"
quired unless the violated requirement
47
role in Title III's regulatory scheme.

42. Not all courts, however, demanded suppression for failure to name a "known" individual. Some of these courts have required that the individual prove prejudice. See, e.g.,
United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d 1395, 1404-06 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905
(1977); United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1140-42 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
1132 (1977); United States v. Kilgore, 524 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
905 (1977); United States v. Rizzo, 492 F.2d 443, 447 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 944
(1974); United States v. Canon, 404 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ala. 1975). In contrast, other
courts have held that a failure to name a "known" person unconditionally required suppression.
See e.g., United States v. Scully, 546 F.2d 255, 265 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970
(1977); United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485, 494-500 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996, 1004 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 430 U.S. 902, rev'd, 556
F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Picone, 408 F. Supp. 255, 260-62 (D. Kan. 1975),
rev'd, 560 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bleau, 363 F. Supp. 438, 441-42 (D. Md.
1973). See also Haina v. State, 30 Md. App. 295, 300, 352 A.2d 874, 878 (1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 906 (1977).
43. 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
44. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
45. 416 U.S. at 565-67; 416 U.S. at 508-10. Title III requires that the Attorney General or
any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General authorize a
wiretap application by federal authorities as a prerequisite to judicial consideration of the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976). This authorization is required to provide "lines of responsibility lead[ing] to an identifiable person" should abuses occur and to centralize "in a publicly
responsible official subject to the political process the formulation of law enforcement policy"
pertaining to electronic surveillance. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 96-97, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2185.
In Chavez, the interception applications recited authorization by the Assistant Attorney
General, whereas in actuality, one application had been approved by the Attorney General and
the second had been approved by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant. 416 U.S. at
565-67. In Giordano, the application stated authorization by a designated Assistant Attorney
General, whereas the authorization was actually obtained from the Executive Assistant to the
Attorney General. 416 U.S. at 508-10.
46. 416 U.S. at 575, quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 522 (1974) (emphasis
added).
47. 416 U.S. at 579-80; 416 U.S. at 527-28. Applying this standard, the Giordano Court
concluded that the proper preapplication authorization required by § 2516(1) was so essential to
the regulatory scheme of Title III that suppression of the intercepted evidence was warranted
for the violation of this provision. Id. In contrast, the Chavez Court, in a five to four decision,
found that since the preapplication authorization, although wrongly identifying the authorizing
federal official, still satisfied the requirements of § 2516(1), the defect was not a fatal one requiring suppression of the intercepted evidence. 416 U.S. at 579-80.
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79

United States v. Donovan4 8 was the Supreme Court's most recent encounter with the role of the naming requirement of section 2518. 4 9 In
Donovan, three defendants in a criminal prosecution for gambling sought to
suppress wiretap evidence on the ground that they were "known" within the
meaning of section 2518, yet had not been named in the interception appli51
50
cation and authorization. Finding that Kahn provided relevant precedent,
the Donovan Court stated that since the government had probable cause to
believe that these petitioners were engaged in criminal activity and would
be overheard on the target telephone, it should have named them in the
application. 52 The Court nevertheless concluded that this violation of the
naming requirement did not warrant suppression of the evidence. 53 The
majority focused upon whether the identification of all those likely to be
overheard played a "substantive role" in the judicial authorization process. 54 The Court reasoned that since other individuals were properly
named in the application, and the addition of the petitioners would not have
precluded judicial authorization of the wiretap, 55 the evidence was not "unJustice Douglas, perhaps concerned that the Court's holdings would pave the way for
further weakenings of Title III's procedural safeguards, wrote a strong dissent in Chavez, which
also served as his concurrence in Giordano. 416 U.S. at 580-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 416
U.S. at 533 (Douglas, J., concurring). Finding no legislative support for the majority's determination that some statutory provisions were "central" to Title III's regulatory scheme, Justice
Douglas did not believe that "Title III ... authorizes the courts to pick and choose among
various statutory provisions, suppressing evidence only when they determine that a provision is
"substantive,' "central,' or 'directly and substantially' related to the congressional scheme." 416 U.S.
at 584-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
49. For a discussion of the naming requirement, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text
supra.
50. 429 U.S. at 421. Two other petitioners, who were not "known" and therefore not named
in the application, but whose conversations had been intercepted, sought suppression of the
intercepted communications on the ground that they had not been served with inventory
notice. Id. For a discussion of the inventory notice requirements of Title II1, see notes 27-31
and accompanying text supra. The Government had failed to include their names on a list
which had been supplied to the judge identifying persons who had been overheard during the
interception. 429 U.S. at 420. The Government contended that Title III imposed no duty upon
it to supply the names of all persons whose conversations were intercepted, but rather that the
judge had the option of asking the Government for the information he might require in order to
exercise his discretionary authority under § 2518(8)(d), 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976). 429 U.S.
at 429. The Government stated that, as a matter of policy, it had supplied the names of identifiable persons against whom it believed there was a reasonable possibility of indictment. Id. at
431. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the legitimate privacy interests of individuals require that the government supply a complete list of all persons overheard during an
interception. Id. at 428-33.
51. 429 U.S. at 423-24 n.l, citing United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974). Although
the Court agreed with the holding of Kahn, that case was dismissed as "relevant, though not
controlling." 429 U.S. at 423-24 n.ll. For a discussion of Kahn, see notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra.
52. 429 U.S. at 428. The Court rejected the Government's argument that only the "principal target" of the investigation-who would usually be the user of the "target" facilities-must
be named, finding no support for this position in the legislative history or statutory language of
Title. III. Id. at 424-28.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 435.
55. Id. at 435-36.
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lawfully intercepted" within the meaning of Title III so as to require suppression.

56

58
The Court found support for its conclusion in Chavez 57 and Giordano,
and noted that "nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended this broad identification requirement to play 'a central, or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance.' "59 The Court did imply, however, that if a defendant could
establish that he was prejudiced by the failure to name him or to send him
inventory notice, or that the government intentionally failed to fulfill these
60
requirements of Title III, the evidence may be suppressed.
The dissent in Donovan argued that the majority took "too narrow a
view of the provision at issue, ignoring its place in the system Congress has
created to restrain wiretapping." 6 1 According to the dissent, the issue was
not whether the naming of the petitioners would have affected the decision
of the judge who issued the authorization, but rather whether the identification requirement is a "central" and "substantive" provision necessary to effectuate the purpose of Title 111.62 Focusing on the naming requirement as

56. Id. at 436. Under Title III, evidence may be suppressed if it was "unlawfully intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i) (1976). See note 32 and accompanying text supra. The Court
rejected any suggestion that the interception authorization was facially insufficient, see 18
U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii) (1976), or that the interception was not conducted in conformity with the
authorization, id. § 2518(10)(a)(iii). 429 U.S. at 432. For the text of these provisions, see text
accompanying note 32 supra. For an analysis of whether a failure to name a "known" person
should render an interception authorization "facially insufficient," see notes 115-20 and accompanying text infra.
57. 429 U.S. at 436, citing United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974). For a discussion of Chavez, see notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
58. 429 U.S. at 435-36, citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974). For a
discussion of Giordano, see notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
59. 429 U.S. at 437, quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974). The Court,
after a brief examination of legislative history, also rejected the contention that "postinterception
notice was intended to serve as an independent restraint on resort to the wiretap procedure."
429 U.S. at 439. Thus, the failure to send inventory notice to the two other petitioners did not
render the interception of their communications "unlawful," and suppression of this evidence
was not required. Id. See note 50 supra.
60. 429 U.S. at 436 n.23, 439 n.26.
61. Id. at 449 (Marshall, J.,dissenting in part). Justice Marshall concurred in the majority's
reaffirmance of Kahn as the standard to be employed in determining who is "known" within the
meaning of § 2518. Id. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). For a discussion of Kahn, see
notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra. Justice Marshall also concurred in the majority's
holding that the government must provide a judge with sufficient information to allow him to
intelligently exercise his discretion in passing on an interception application. 429 U.S. at 445
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall dissented, however, from the Court's determination that § 2518 is not a "central" provision of Title III,and from the Court's denial of
suppression of the intercepted evidence. Id. at 445-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). For the
majority's position in Donovan, see notes 48-60 and accompanying text supra.
62. 429 U.S. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall initially reaffirmed
Justice Douglas' position in Chavez that the Court lacks the discretion to designate some provisions of Title II as "central" or "substantive." Id. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). See
note 47 supra. However, the dissent noted that the Chavez Court had rejected this argument,
and that "nothing is to be gained by renewing it here." 429 U.S. at 455 (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part).
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a statutory "trigger" for other provisions of Title 111,63 the dissent would
have designated this requirement as a "central" provision, thereby requiring
64
suppression of the intercepted communications for its violation.
Courts confronted with the issue of suppression of electronic surveillance evidence acquired as a result of a defective application and authorization under Title III's naming requirement have followed the Supreme
Court's decision in Donovan.6 5 The lower courts have generally been unable to find the prejudice to a defendant or the intentional failure by the
government to follow the statutory requirements of Title III necessary to
66
warrant suppression of wiretap evidence.
III. A CASE FOR SUPPRESSION

A. The Need
The Donovan decision and its progeny illustrate a judicial assessment of
the role of the naming requirement of section 2518 with respect to Title III's
regulatory scheme. 6 7 It is submitted that by relegating the naming requirement to an "undoubtedly important," though not "central," role in Title
III's statutory framework, 68 the Supreme Court has receded from the strict
63. 429 U.S. at 446-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Justice Marshall observed that the
naming requirement operated to "trigger" preauthorization judicial review and postinterception
service of inventory notice. Id. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). See notes 26-29 and
accompanying text supra.
64. 429 U.S. at 449 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). Moreover, the dissent, noting that the
inventory notice requirement "triggers" Title IlI's sanctions forthe misuse of electronic surveillance, would also have designated this as a "central" provision. Id. at 449-50 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part). See note 31 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, the dissent would have
required suppression of the evidence with respect to those petitioners whose names had been
omitted from the Government's list identifying the individuals whose conversations had been
intercepted. 429 U.S. at 449-50. (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). See notes 50 & 59 supra.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Diadone, 558 F.2d 775, 780-81 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Picone, 560 F.2d 998, 1002
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879, 883-85 (1st Cir. 1977); United States
v. Easterling, 554 F.2d 195, 196 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bernstein, 556 F.2d 244 (4th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977); United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 21-22 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855
(1977); United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 536 n.19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985
(1977); State v. Shy, 373 A.2d 215 (Del. 1977); State v. Sanchez, 149 N.J. Super. 381, 373 A.2d
1028 (1977); State v. Luciano, 148 N.J. Super. 551, 372 A.2d 1319 (1977).
The Supreme Court has also vacated or denied certiorari in several cases in light of Donovan. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 546 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970
(1977); United States v. Lee, 542 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 430 U.S.
902 (1977); United States v. Civella, 533 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905
(1977); United States v. Bernstein, 509 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 430
U.S. 902, rev'd, 556 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1977).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879, 886 (1st Cir. 1977) (defendant did
not prove prejudice and, due to failure to raise "intentional" violation in district court, defendant was precluded from raising such ground on appeal); United States v. Landmesser, 553
F.2d 17, 21-22 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977) (no proof of prejudice or an intentional violation by the government); United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 536 n.19 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) (no evidence that the government intentionally failed to name
defendant).
67. See notes 48-60 & 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
68. 429 U.S. at 434.
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requirement of particularization made by Berger 9 and has weakened
the effectiveness of Title III in protecting the public from the possibility of
serious invasions of privacy.
By failing to designate the naming requirement as a "central" provision
requiring suppression for its violation, 70 the Supreme Court has placed this
regulatory aspect of Title III in the position of the proverbial dog whose bark
is worse than its bite. Whatever deterrent effect mandatory suppression had
on preventing violations of section 2518 may now be lost, thereby increasing
the potential for abuse of electronic surveillance. 71 For example, one purpose of the naming requirement is to ensure adequate judicial supervision of
the interception process. 72 In order to aid the judge in the intelligent exercise of his discretion, the application must contain a record of all previous
applications submitted concerning the person who is the focus of the present
application. 73 This procedure was intended to protect against repeated invasions of a person's privacy and to guard against the use of electronic surveillance as a "dragnet." 75 However, if law enforcement officials, having
previously submitted applications for an interception directed at a particular
individual, are fearful that a judge may, in his discretion, deny a current
application which includes that individual as a target of the interception, the
officials can omit that individual's name from the application, thus frustrating
75
the judicial regulation of interceptions.
Another area in which Donovan undermines the strict regulatory aspects of Title III is the mandatory inventory notice which must be supplied
to all those named in the application and authorization. 76 Although the
77
judge may require that inventory notice be sent to an unnamed person,
this provision does not ensure full protection from the potential abuses of
electronic surveillance, nor does it contribute to allaying the "secret fears" of
the public concerning electronic surveillance. 7 Rather, it is submitted that
a decrease in the protection of privacy and an enhancement of societal fears
about electronic surveillance follow from Donovan. A law enforcement official, wishing to avoid revealing to an individual the fact that his conversations have been overheard, may omit that person's name from the applica69. For a discussion of Berger, see notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
70. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
71. The use of electronic surveillance techniques is usually carefully planned and, thus,
electronic surveillance "appears uniquely and highly susceptible to the restraining influence of
deterrence." J. CARRa, supra note 1, at 354-55. See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 30, at §
2.3(d).
72. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
73. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(e) (1976).
74. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
75. It is arguable that such actions by law enforcement officials may be found to be an
"intentional" violation of Title III's statutory structure, thus providing a ground for suppression.
See text accompanying note 60 supra. It appears doubtful, however, that a defendant could
successfully obtain suppression on this ground. See notes 83-90 & 143 and accompanying text
infra.
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976); notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976); note 29 and accompanying text supra.
78. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 30.
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tion in the hope that the judge will not require discretionary inventory
79
notice to be sent to that person.
This possibility could have two serious consequences. First, unaware
that an interception has occurred, an individual would not be able to pursue
the civil remedies permitted under Title III for unlawful interceptions.8 0
Second, since it is posited that the individual is "known" at the time of the
application-that is, that the applicant has probable cause to believe that
the individual is engaged in criminal activity, and is using the target telephone 8 -he could be hindered in his defense preparation should an indictment be brought against him. 8 2 In regard to the public's "secret fears"
of electronic surveillance, it is submitted that any diminution of the degree
of impartial and intelligent legislative or judicial control over the use of electronic surveillance, especially where it concerns the very ability of an individual to learn that his conversations have been overheard, can only increase
the public's fear of unwarranted invasions of privacy.
It is arguable that the Donovan decision addresses these potential
problems since the Court implicitly left open the possibility that the fruits of
an interception may be suppressed for failure to name a "known" person if
the defendant can show that he was prejudiced by the omission 83 or that
the omission was intentional.8 4 It is submitted, however, that these possible grounds for suppression are not viable in that they impose an insurmountable evidentiary burden on the defendants. First, the prejudice
ground would appear to be unavailable to a defendant in most instances.
Assuming compliance 8 5 with section 2518(9),86 it will be hard for a defendant to present a strong prejudice argument, since he will have had knowledge of the interception for at least ten days prior to trial.8 7 One court has
noted: "We doubt that many defendants will be able to make a showing of
actual prejudice." 8
79. As one writer has observed: "[T]here is considerable opportunity tinder § 2518(1)(b)(iv)
to circumvent the notice provision by a deliberately incomplete investigation." J. CARR, supra
note 1, at 38. See also note 75 supra.
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976); note 31 and accompanying text supra.
81. For a discussion of this interpretation of § 2518(1)(b)(iv) by the Kahn Court, see notes
33-40 and accompanying text supra.
82. Title III provides that a defendant must be given a copy of the court order and application within ten days prior to trial if evidence derived from the interception is to be introduced
at that trial. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976). This would appear to allow a defendant some time in
which to prepare a defense with the knowledge that an interception has occurred, thus negating
a possible prejudice argument. However, at least one court has noted that § 2518(9) is not
meant to be used to negate the possible prejudicial effect of a failure to provide a defendant
inventory notice, but "is intended to provide the defendant whose telephone has been subject
to wiretap an opportunity to test the validity of the wiretapping authorization" prior to trial.
United States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057, 1063 n.13 (3d Cir. 1972).
83. 429 U.S. at 439 n.26.
84. Id. at 436 n.23.
85. If a defendant has not received inventory notice pursuant to § 2518(8)(d), and the requirements of § 2518(9) have not been satisfied, then the evidence derived from the interception will automatically be excluded from trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976). For a discussion of § 2518(9), see note 82 supra.
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1976). But see note 82 and accompanying text supra.
88. United States v. Harrigan, 557 F.2d 879, 884 (1st Cir. 1977).
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In attempting to compel suppression on the ground that the law enforcement officials intentionally omitted his name from the application, a
defendant will be placed in the onerous position of having to prove the subjective motivation of the applicant. Circumstantial evidence with which a
defendant might seek to establish an intentional omission will invariably be
in the possession of those opposing suppression, 8" a situation in which possibilities for obstruction and deception exist. It is thus submitted that a defendant will rarely be able to suppress evidence for failure to name him in
the application on the grounds of prejudice or an intentional omission. 9"
Moreover, in its discussion of the question of intentional omissions, the
Donovan Court stated: "There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents knowingly failed to identify respondents ...for the purpose
of keeping relevant information from the District Court . . . . If such a
showing had been made, we would have a different case." 9 1 It would appear
to follow from this language that in order to compel suppression on the
ground that an intentional omission has occurred, a defendant must not only
prove that the Kahn requirements existed and that the applicant was aware
of this fact, thereby rendering a failure to name the defendant in the application implicitly intentional, but also must prove that a specific purpose was to
be fulfilled by the omission. The defendant's burden of proof in seeking
suppression is thus increased to an even greater magnitude.
B. The Rationale
In light of the potential abuses outlined above, a reexamination of the
Donovan Court's analysis is warranted. 9 2 It is submitted, contrary to the
position of the Donovan majority, that the naming requirement of section
2518 is central to the implementation of Title III's regulatory framework.
Specifically, the Donovan majority's focus seems misplaced. In Chavez
and Giordano, the Court held that a violation of a Title III provision does
not require suppression of evidence obtained as a result thereof unless that
provision played a "central, or even functional, role in guarding against unwarranted use of electronic surveillance." 93 These holdings thus advanced
the primary policy underlying Title Ill. 94 The majority in Donovan, however, narrowly focused its analysis on the determination of whether Title
III's naming requirement played a substantive role in the "judicial authorization of [an] intercept order." 95 Is is submitted that by narrowing the issue
89. Given the general statutory scheme of Title 111-that the government initiates the interception process-the government will be in possession of first hand knowledge of the circumstances leading up to an application for interception. See notes 23 & 45 and accompanying
text supra.
90. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
91. 429 U.S. at 436 n.23 (emphasis added).
92. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Donovan, see notes 48-60 and accompanying
text supra.
93. 416 U.S. at 578. See 416 U.S. at 527. For a discussion of Chavez and Giordano, see
notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
94. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
95. 429 U.S. at 435. See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
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in this respect, the majority failed to consider the overall purpose of Title III
and the precedent established by Chavez and Giordano.96
The dissent in Donovan recognized this deficiency,9 7 and, in contrast to
the majority, framed the issue as being whether the naming requirement
"directly and substantially implement[s] the congressional intention to limit
the use of interception procedures," 9 8 and not whether the requirement
affects a judge's decision with respect to the issuance of a particular warrant. 99 Following the precedent of Chavez and Giordano, it is submitted
that the dissent's analysis is correct, 10 0 and in light of the central position
that the naming requirement occupies in Title III's statutory scheme, evidence intercepted in violation of this provision should be suppressed. 10 1
Further support for the dissent's position can be found when one considers that Title III was drafted with the Berger decision 102 in congressional
hands. 10 3 In Berger, the statute at issue required the naming of the person
or persons whose communications were to be intercepted. 10 4 While this
requirement withstood the Supreme Court's scrutiny, the statute was invalidated for its failure to require that the nature of the conversations to be
overheard be specified.' 0 5 A close reading of Berger would seem to suggest
that if the statute in question had failed to require the naming of persons to
be overheard, rather than failing to specify the nature of the communications
to be intercepted, the Court would not have altered its decision. 10 6 It is
therefore suggested that a failure to name all "known" persons 107 in an
interception application should be a constitutional violation mandating suppression. As a constitutional requirement, the naming provision must by
necessity play a "central" and "substantive" role in Title III. Indeed, if the
initial authorization requirement provided in section 2516,108 which is not
96. The Donovan Court did apply the "central and substantive" test as enunciated in
Chavez and Giordano. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted, however,
that the Court's findings with respect to the naming requirement in relation to the statutory
scheme of Title II1 were conclusory, and that the Court placed greater emphasis on the narrow
issue of whether the violation of the naming requirement would have precluded judicial authorization of this particular interception. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
97. 429 U.S. at 449-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). See notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra.
98. 429 U.S. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part), quoting United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).
99. 429 U.S. at 446-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
100. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion in Donovan, see notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
101. See 429 U.S. at 449-(Marshall, J., dissenting in part); notes 63 & 64 and accompanying
text supra.
102. For a discussion of Berger, see notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
103. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2112, 2190; text accompanying note 3 supra.
104. 388 U.S. at 59.
105. Id. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
106. See 388 U.S. at 55-59. The Berger Court referred to the fourth amendment requirement
that a warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." 388 U.S. at 56, quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
107. For a discussion of who is a "known" person within the meaning of § 2518, see notes
33-40 and accompanying text supra.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1976).
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constitutionally mandated, 10 9 was designated as a "central" provision in
Giordano"10 and Chavez,"' it is submitted that the congressionally recognized constitutional requirement of particularization, 112 as effectuated by the
naming requirement of section 2518,113 should be no less a "central" and
114
"substantive" provision.
The majority in Donovan also summarily rejected the contention that
section 2518(10)(a)(ii) 115 required the suppression of the intercepted evidence. 1 16 Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) provides a ground for suppression if "the
order of authorization or approval under which [the communication] was intercepted is insufficient on its face." 1 1 7 It is submitted that the Donovan
109. The Berger Court stated that fourth amendment requires that a "neutral and detached
authority be interposed between the police and the public." 388 U.S. at 54. This requirement is
satisfied by causing an interception order to issue only upon judicial determination. Id. See 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (1976). Intermediate authorization by the Attorney General of the United States
or his designate, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of a state or a political subdivision
thereof, is not a constitutional mandate, although it is required tinder Title III. See 18 U.S.C. §
2516 (1976).
110. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974). For a discussion of Giordano, see
notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
111. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974). For a discussion of Chavez, see
notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
112. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
113. Section 2518, which includes the naming requirement, was drafted by Congress with
the aim of fulfilling the constitutional requirement of particularization. See text accompanying
note 22 supra.
114. The Supreme Court in Donovan recognized that Congress intended the naming requirement to fulfill the "constitutional command of particularization." 429 U.S. at 426-27, quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2190. The Court, however, relegated the constitutional issue to a short footnote.
429 U.S. at 427 n.15. The Court stated that "[i]t is not a constitutional requirement that all
those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations be named." Id. (emphasis
added). It is submitted that there is a clear distinction between those "likely to be overheard
engaging in incriminating conversations," and those whom law enforcement officials have probable cause to believe are engaging in criminal activity and are using the target telephones. The
constitutional demand is one of probable cause. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-55
(1967). Indeed, the Donovan Court cited with approval the Kahn determination that a person
should be named in the application and authorization if the Government possesses sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the person was engaged in criminal activity
and was using the target telephone. 429 U.S. at 423-24 & n.ll, citing United States v. Kahn,
415 U.S. 143 (1977). See 429 U.S. at 427; note 40 supra. Thus, the above passage, assumed by
the Court to settle the constitutional issue involved, merely avoided that issue.
The Court further stated that specification of all those likely to be overheard is unnecessary
since the authorization merely "identif [ies] the person whose constitutionally protected area is
to be invaded rather than 'particularly describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized." 429 U.S. at 427 n.15, quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
The Court, however, does not supply the context from which the quotation is taken. The quotation, in its proper context, does not suggest that the naming of a "known" person is not constitutionally mandated. Rather, it is used in Berger to illustrate that the naming requirement, in
and of itself, is not constitutionally sufficient to protect an individual's privacy in a wiretap
situation. See 388 U.S. at 59. See also note 106 and accompanying text supra.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii) (1976).
116. 429 U.S. at 432.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii) (1976). As the Donovan Court noted, § 2518 "provides alternative grounds on which one may seek suppression of wiretap evidence obtained in violation of
Title Ill's statutory provision." 429 U.S. at 433 n.22 (emphasis supplied by the Court). Thus, §
2518(10)(a)(ii), unlike § 2518(10)(a)(i), does not require a finding that the communications were
"unlawfully intercepted." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i) (1976) with id. § 2518(10)(a)(ii). It

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss1/4

14

Goldberg: An Examination of the Naming Requirement of Tittle III in Light o

1978-1979]

COMMENT

majority too hastily concluded that section 2518(10)(a)(ii) was inapplicable
since the statutory requirement that an application name a "known" individual"" has been firmly established by the Supreme Court. 119 By thus
failing to name a "known" individual in the initial application, it is submitted
that the judicial authorization which flows from that application necessarily
will be "insufficient on its face." Following this reasoning, once a defendant
establishes that he was "known" but was not named in the application, suppression of the evidence derived from the interception should automatically
be granted on the grounds of facial insufficiency without a further showing of
20
prejudice or an intentional omission by the applicant.1
IV. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF

The possibility of suppression of interception evidence for either an intentional failure to name a "known" person or a showing of prejudice by the
defendant' 2' raises two interesting issues. First, if, as the Supreme Court
has stated, a person must be named in an interception application when
probable cause exists under Kahn, and assuming that such probable cause
does exist, then the question arises as to what excuses justify a failure to
name that person in the initial application. One may assume that a blatant
disregard by the applicant of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause
may be construed as an intentional omission by the court. As has been previously suggested, however, a defendant will generally be hard pressed to
establish that the applicant has intentionally violated Title III's provisions, or
12 3
that the defendant was prejudiced by the applicant's conduct.
Assuming, therefore, that the Donovan Court's analysis was sound and
that mandatory suppression of evidence for a failure to name a "known"
person in an interception application is neither required nor even desirable,
it is submitted that "[a]t the very least, the burden should be on the government to show valid cause, as opposed to negligence, for noncompliance
and that no prejudice in fact occurred." 124
is therefore submitted that an examination of whether a provision is "central" to Title III's
statutory scheme-which is relevant in the determination of whether communications were
"unlawfiully intercepted"-is unnecessary tinder § 2518(10)(a)(ii).
It has also been suggested that § 2518(10)(a)(ii) necessarily implies a violation of §
251 8 (10)(a)(i), thus rendering an interception violative of § 2518(10)(a)(ii) "unlawful" within the
meaning of § 2518(10)(a)(i). See J. CARR, supra note 1, at 344-46.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1976). Section 2518(1)(b)(iv) provides that "each application
shall include . . . the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted." Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v. Kahn, 415
U.S. 143 (1974).
119. 429 U.S. at 428. See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
120. Nowhere in the language of § 2518(10)(a) is a party moving for suppression required to
make an additional showing of prejudice or that an intentional violation of the statute has occurred. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976).
121. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
122. 429 U.S. at 428. See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
123. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text supra.
124. J. CARR, supra note 1, at 357. Mr. Carr also suggests as an additional requirement that
"the government should show a change in policies and practices sufficient to render deterrence
by exclusion unnecessary." Id.
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The rationale for shifting the burden upon a motion to suppress would be
similar to that employed by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United
States.1 25 In Wong Sun, the Court held that verbal statements obtained
during an unlawful warrantless arrest must be suppressed as "fruits" of that
arrest.126 In regard to other evidence acquired on the basis of the suppressed verbal statements, the Supreme Court concluded that suppression would
be required unless the obtainment of the evidence had been so attenuated
from the primary illegality as to purge the taint of that illegality. 127 In
28
Nardone v. United States,' 29
support of its conclusion, the Court cited'
which had placed the burden upon the Government to prove attenua30
tion.'
It is settled law that an interception application must name all "known"
persons if the probable cause test of Kahn is satisfied.'l 3 Hence, a failure to
name a "known" person is a prima facie violation of section 2518.132 It is
submitted that although the Donovan Court held that a violation of the
naming requirement of section 2518 does not render an interception so unlawful as to require suppression of the evidence under Title III, l 33 such a
statutory violation taints the entire interception process as to the unnamed
individual.' 3 4 The evidence derived from such a tainted interception then
3 5
becomes the "fruits" of the Government's statutorily violative conduct.1
Applying an analysis paralleling that employed by the Court in Wong Sun
and Nardone, once the defendant has shown a violation of the naming requirement of section 2518, the burden of proof should be upon the Government to show attenuation.' 3 6 Attenuation in this instance could be interpreted as compelling the Government to establish that good cause existed
for the violation and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the Government's actions.' 3 7 In this way, the deterrent element of Title 111138 will be
preserved and the policies underlying the statutory requirements will be
advanced.139

125. 371
126. 1d.
127. Id.
128. Id.

U.S. 471 (1963).
at 485.
at 487-88.
at 487.

129. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).

130. Id. at 341-42. The Government failed in Wong Sun to carry its burden of proof and the
evidence in question was suppressed. 371 U.S. at 488.
131. See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text su pra.
132. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
133. 429 U.S. at 435-37. See notes 51-60 and accompanying text supra.
134. This taint would arise from the government's failure to obtain judicial authorization for
interception of the "known," yet unnamed, individual's communications, as required by Title
III. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 51 & 52 and accompanying
text supra.
135. See text accompanying note 126 supra. The interception evidence would also be tainted
if the interception itself is viewed as "'unlawful." See notes 92-120 and accompanying text su pra.
136. See notes 60 & 124-30 and accompanying text supra.
137. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
139. See notes 6, 24-25 & 30 and accompanying text sapra.
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COMMENT
V.

CONCLUSION

This comment has suggested that the Supreme Court, in a line of recent
decisions culminating with Donovan,' 40 has consistently and effectively relaxed the regulatory impact of Title Ill. 14 1 After Donovan, section 2518 of
Title III requires that an interception application name all "known" persons,
but if the application is lawful as to a named individual, a failure to name
additional "known" persons in the application will not require suppression of
their intercepted communications unless that failure was intentional or the
defendant was prejudiced by the omission. 142 The naming requirement of
section 2518 is therefore left with little, if any, deterrent elements to support its enforcement. The Court's interpretation of the naming requirement
will undoubtedly affect other provisions of Title III: directly, as in the area
of inventory notice,14 3 and indirectly, as has already occurred with respect to
Title III's requirement that an interception application disclose all previous
applications submitted concerning an individual named in the current application. 144
It has been suggested in this comment that the Donovan Court, by
confining itself to a narrow scope of inquiry, erred in concluding that a violation of the naming requirement of section 2518 does not mandate suppression of interception evidence. 145 It has been further suggested that if the
Donovan decision is correct and mandatory suppression of evidence is
neither required nor desired for a violation of section 2518, then the government should have the burden of proving that its violation was unintentional and did not prejudice the defendant.148 In this manner, the deterr47
ence element implicit in Title III will be preserved rather than weakened.1
The Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing the potential harm inherent in
Donovan, suggested that "strict adherence by the Government to the
provisions of Title III would nonetheless be more in keeping with the responsibilities Congress has imposed upon it when authority to engage in
wiretapping or electronic surveillance is sought." 148 This hope for "strict
adherence," however, does not adequately ensure that electronic surveillance will be intelligently utilized with the restraint necessary to meaning140. See notes 33-66 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 67-91 and accompanying text supra.
142. 429 U.S. at 428, 435-36. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 76-82 and accompanying text supra.
144. See United States v. Abramson, 553 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911
(1977). In Abramson, the application failed to fully disclose that previous wiretaps were exe2
cuted upon a "known," yet unnamed, individual, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 518(1)(e) (1976).
553 F.2d at 1169. The court, applying the rationale of Donovan, found that § 2518(1)(e) was not
.'central or functional in guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance" and denied the defendant's motion to suppress the intercepted evidence. Id. at 1170.
145. See notes 92-120 and accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 121-39 and accompanying text supra; J. CARR, supra note 1, at 357. See also
United States v. Doolittle, 518 F.2d 500, 501-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977); United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485, 493-500 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
147. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
148. 429 U.S. at 440, quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 580 (1974).
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fully protect the privacy of individuals. As the dissent in Donovan poignantly
observed: "[H]ope is a poor substitute for certainty that the Government will
make every effort to fulfill its responsibilities under Title III. We can obtain
that certainty only by according full recognition to the role of the naming
149
and notice requirements in the statutory scheme created by Congress."
Although "hope is a poor substitute for certainty," one can only hope that
the Court, or Congress, will see fit to return the bite to the barking dog.
William D. Goldberg

149. 429 U.S. 450-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
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